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Muhammad Ali and the Decline and Revival rhesis in
Modern Egyptian History
by Kenneth M. Cuno
Taking up the theme of this seminar, "reform, modernization,
or continuity," this paper will discuss the issue of periodization. Its
point of departure is the question of why the prevailing interpretation
holds that there is a fundamental discontinurty between the eighteenth
and nineteenth cenfuries. In other words, why does "ottoman" history
end, and the "modem" history of Egypt begttu with the reign of
Muhammad Ali? Merely to ask these questions is to suggest that the
prevailing view of the Muhammad Ali period and the historical
narrative of which that view is an integral part are not the only
possible interpretation that one can arrive at when studyrng Eglrptian
history. The idea of Muhammad Ali as "the founder of modern Eglrpt'
is not something that sprang spontaneously from the sources onto the
pages of history books. Historical knowledge is a cultural artifac! in
the sense that it is produced in particular circumstances and at specific
moments. I think it is useful for us as historians to keep that in mind
and, occasionally, to set aside our documents and raise questions
about interpretative frameworks, such as this one, that we often tend
to take for granted.
Periodization 
- 
the division of history into distinct periods 
- 
is
an expression of a particular interpretative framework. when I began
studying the Muhammad Ali period I was impressed by the sharp
dichotomy that exists in the historical literature between the
"ottoman" arrd "modern" eras. This dichotomy was not fully
established as the prevailing historical interpretation until the
M
monarchy period (L922-1952), even though its roots reach back much
farther. In its modern form, the present conventional interpretation
holds not only that the beginning of modern Egypt was an
accomplishment of Muhammad Ali (and/or of Napoleon), but also that
the modern revival occurred after a long period of decline under
Ottoman rule. Hence, in the conventional interpretation, the thesis of
Eglrpt's modern revival is closely related to another thesis, that of
"Ottoman.decline." According to the latter thesis, inEgyptandthe
rest of the Ottoman Empire the period from the mid-sixteenth century
through the end of the eighteenth century was one of political anarchy,
intellectual and cultural sterility, and economic and demographic
decline.
The idea of Muhammad Ali as "the founder of modern Egypt"
is usually juxtaposed against the dark image of Ottoman-era decline,
and as such it goes far beyond an accounting of the Pasha's many real
accomplishments and their impact. Rather, the Muhammad Ali period
is portrayed as the antithesis of the "Ottoman" period: in place of
political anarchy, Muhammad Ali established order; in place of
intellectual and cultural sterility, Muhammad Ali initiated an age of
enlightenment; and, in place ofeconomic anddemographic decline,
Muhammad Ali put Egypt on the road to progress and growth.
During the past twenty-five years, however, this dichotomy
between the "Ottoman" and "modern" periods in the conventional
interpretation has been undermined. There has been a renaissance in
studies of the "Ottomen period" 
- 
the sixteenth through eighteenth
centuries 
- 
in Egypt, Bilad al-Sham and other parts of the Ottoman
Empire that has made the Ottoman decline thesis untenablQ. Instead of
seeing the sixteenth through eighteenth century period as an era of
political anarchy, scholars such as Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, Daniel
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Crecelius, Leslie Peirce, and Jane Hathawayl have re-framed the
political history of that period in terms of a sffuctural fansformation.
The centralized rule of the "classical" era (mid-fifteenth through mid-
sixteenth centuries) gave way to a much more decentralized "politics
of households," in which elite househ'olds in the imperial center as
well as in the provinces competed for resources and power. This work
on political households is complementary to other studies, mainly of
Bilad al-Sham, which highlight the role of the urban notables during
the Ottoman period.2 The politics of the "Ottoman" period now
appears not to have been anarchic, but merely stnrcturally different
from the preceding period (mid-fifteenth through mid-sixteenth
centuries) and the succeeding one (nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
The thesis of intellectual and cultural sterility is perhaps
exemplified by David Ayalon's article, "The Historian al-Jabarti"
(1962), in which he described al-Jabarti as a unique genius in an
intellectual wasteland.3 Gamal al-Din al-shayyal made advanced an
early challenge to that viewpoint with his review of eighteenth-
century intellectual activity. His argument that in the Islamic Middle
East the eighteenth century was a period of intellectual revival
anticipated the viewpoint propounded later by Peter Gran.a ln addition
to falsifuing the thesis of Ottoman-era intellectual and cultural
stagnation, the trajectory of Shayyal's and Gran's studies has been
toward connecting eighteenth-century intellectual and cultural activity
with that of the nineteenth century. Their worh along with a growing
number of studies in and editions of the manuscripts of ottoman
Eg1pt, has discredited the thesis of intellectual and cultural sterility.
Although the main trends in nineteenth-century intellectual and
cultural life were different from those of the ottoman period,
%
95
difference is not the same thing as sterility'
The idea of a demographic decline in the Ottoman era has also
been corrected, at least for Egypt, by Andre Raymond and Nelly Hanna.
Eggpt's population appeafs to hpve grown in the sixteenth century and to
have fluctuated thereafter.5 There was a parallel expansion of population
in sixteenth-century Anatolia, and we can at least pose the question of
whether there were similar trends in the other provinces of the Empire -
that is, whether the Ottoman side of the Mediterranean experienced the
same or similar demographic rhythms as the European side. tn Egypt,
again, and working backward from late nineteenth-century data, Justin
McCarthy and Daniel Panzac have argued convincittgly that the Egyptian
population circa 1800 was probably around 4 million, or in other words
about twice the previously accepted figure, which was based on an
estimate made during the French expedition'6
As for the question of economic decline, it is now accepted that the
international trade of Egypt did not collapse after the Portuguese rounded the
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cape of Good Hope. Rather, there were a series of sfructural changes in this
fade from the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth centurylThe local
Egyptian economy seems to have expanded during the frst century of
ottoman rule, and to have fluctuated thereafter, suffering a sharp setback
only in the late eighteenttr century. In The Pasha's Peasants I argue ttrat
during the first three centuries of ottoman rule there were economic ups and
downs, but no refrogression in economic structures. I disprove the
accusation ttrat the Manrluks and/or the Ottomans allowed the irrigation
system to deteriorate through neglect, showing that the system was not
neglected until the crisis of *re late eighteenth century. I also emphasize the
existence of sophisticated commercial structures and practices in the
economy before 1800, which facilitated the rise of a more commercialized
economy in the nineteenth century.f
As a consequence of this new scholarship it is much more difficult
to draw a line circa 1800 asmarking the beginning of "modern" history in
Egypt, or a few decades later for the other fuab countries. From *re
perspective of "the politics of households," Muhammad Ali looks like a
very successful head of a political household, and from the perspective of
"the politics the notables," there appears to be much continuity in the local
political leadership of Bilad al-Sham between the "Ottoman" and "modern"
periodsl The new work on Ottoman-era intellectual and cultural history also
suggests a degree of continuity with the nineteenth century, and the new
studies in ottoman-era economic history indicate that the nineteenth century
developments were based upon pre-existing structures. Thus, although
certainly there were important qualitative changes in the nineteenth century,
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it is no longer possible to regard the "modern" period, beginning with
Muhammad Ali, as the antithesis of the "Ottoman" period'
The question ttrat needs to be asked at this point is why, in spite of this
new scholarship, does the old framework persist? What accounts for the
durability of the thesis of Ottoman decline and revival, and the related idea
of Muhammad Ali as "the founder of modern Egypt"?
Thanks to the work of Edward Saidllnd others we are well aware of the
ways in which the discourses of Orientalism, colonialism, and
modernization have conmibuted to the decline-and-modernization thesis.
However, these discoulses are not the only source of the thesis, and,
ironically, an exclusive emphasis on its "foreign" origins tends to reproduce
the frope of an aggressively active West imposing its nolms on a passive or
static East. That ffope, which denies any agency to actors in the East, is one
of the hallmarks of the discourses of Orientalism, colonialism, and
modemization. While not discounting the importance of those discourses, in
this paper I want to sketch ttre outlines of the indigenous of "Eastern"
conmibution to the decline and revival thesis, specifically in the Egyptian
context. My purpose is to demonsffate that this thesis was not irnposed
unilaterally by foleigners, but that, instead, the consffuction of the deciine
and revival thesis was a'Joint venture" in which the Ottoman and Egyptian
conffibution was a vital element. Or, in other words, the decline and revival
thesis and the idea of Muhammad Ali as "the founder of modern Egypt"
were formed through a dialectic between Western and Eastern discourses'
I
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In order to show this I will focus on three Ottoman and Egyptian
conffibutions to these theses. First, the roots of the decline thesis can be
found in Ottoman political writings of the sixteenth through the eighteenth
centuries, which were the earliest in either ttre East or ttre West to assert that
the Empire was experiencing a decline. Second, in the Ottoman Empire,
including Egypt, the rhetoric of *re Nizam-i Jadid and Tanzimal reformers
emphasized the idea of a previous decline as a way of legitimating the
reform agenda. Thkd, in ttre first half of the twentieth century, the view of
Muhammad Ali as "the founder of modern Egypt" became the
conventional one as a result of scholarship pafronized and/or encouraged by
King Fuad and his son Faruq, the great-grandson and great-great-grandson
of Muhammad Ali, respectively.
0rigin of the decline thesis.
Long before European intellectuals seized upon the idea of *re
decline and decadence of the Ottoman Empire, a $oup of Ottoman writers
was insisting that the Empire had declined since its "golden age" in the
fifteenth and early sixteenttr centuries. These writers produced a genre of
political works known in Ottoman studies asthe nasihatname literature. The
nasihatname lituature belonged to a well e$ablished nadition of writing on
statecraft in Islamic history, including, for example, the famous Siyasatname
written by the Saljuk vezir Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092). However, in addition
to addressing the practicalities of ruling, many of the Ottoman authors
compared their own time unfavorably with the strength and prosperity of
the the "classical" age. The old order had broken down, they alleged,
causing the empire to decline.
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Several generations of scholars accepted these writings as nothing
more than objective descriptions of Ottoman decline, a tendency
exemplified by Bernard,,Lewis in his article "Ottoman Observers of
Ottoman Decline" (1962i, which also gives a good synopsis of the views
expressed rnthe nasihatname literature. Nowadays, a younger generation of
Ottoman historians understands the nasihatnamelitetatwe as polemic rather
than objective description. These works created a discourse of decline, as a
way of criticizing changes in the way the Empire functioned - changes such
as the nse of "the politics of households," beginning in the mid-sixteenth
century. Abou-El-Haj has argued that these writings need t0 be viewed as
'political fracts that represent a struggle wi*rin the ruling elite,'ilthat is,
between those who opposed change and those who accepted it. Although
the "decline" of the Ottoman Empire was announced in these writings as
early as the mid-sixteenth century, very little actually occuned that could be
described as "decline" until the beginning of the eighteenth centur!, when
the Empire began to suffer permanent tenitorial losseJ., Moreover, what
"declined" in the eighteenth century was the rnititary effectiveness of the
Empire vis-i-vis its European adversaries, and the political center's hold on
the provinceJlRt Oougtas Howard has written,
[The] theory of the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth
to eighteenth centuries rests primarily on the interpretations of
contemporary Ottoman political writers; the idea was, in other
words, first an Ottoman creation. It found ready acceptance among
subsequent generations of Ottoman intellectuals and was repeated
in Ottomap political literature of the next two centuries. Through
100
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translation of this literature into western languages, the Ottoman
intellectual analysis of the Ottoman decline became its accepted
modern scholarly interpretation] {
Howard's main point is that the thesis of Ottoman decline was originally
"an Ottoman creation." But here I want to suggest another important link
between the decline thesis and the rhetoric of the nineteenth century Nizam-i
J adid and T anzimdl reforms.
The rhetoric of nineteenth century reform.
By the late eighteenth century ttre decline thesis was 'widely
accepted in Ottoman intellectual circles. According to Lewis,
Ottoman statesmanship was still looking backward to ttre golden
age in the past, and earnest reformers saw the only hope of salvation
in a restoration of Islam and of the pure and ancient ffaditions of ttre
house of Osman. ln1792, when Selim III asked a score of eminent
Ottomans for their advice on how to run the Empire, there were
many who still gave the same answer. There were some, however,
who had found another *uylt
Here, l,ewis was drawing a distinction between traditionalists, who were
"still looking backward to the golden age," and others, who would support
the Nizam-i Jadid, a European-inspired reform. However, both camps
agreed that a decline had occuned and that reform was needed. The decline
thesis provided ttre proponents of ttre Nizam and later of the Tanzimat
reforms with a justification for their agenda, and 
- 
just as important 
- 
with a
means of discrediting their conservative opponents.
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In the conventional modern interpretation these reforms are
presented as innovative, but initially the reformers presented them as a
restoration of the old order. For example, in the Imperial Rescript of the
Rose Chamber, issued by Sultan Abdulmajid in 1839, the opening
paragraphs invoke ttre decline thesis: they assert that "in ttre first days of ttre
Ottoman monarchy, the glorious precepts of the Koran and the laws of the
empire were always honored," and that this led to strength and prospenty.
Hower'*r, "in the last one hundred and fifty years ... [ttrese precepts and
iaws were disregarded], and ttre former sffength and prosperity have
chariged into weakness and poverty ...." The timing of ttre onset of decline
in this version of events may be a reference to-the Empire's first permanent
telosses, which occuned approximately one hundred and fifty hijri yews
earlier. In any event, one can see that at this stage the reform program was
being presented as necessitated by decline, and as a restoration of that which
had once made the empire geat. In Egypt, Muhammad Ali employed a
similar rhetorical sffategy, for example, in *te law of 1829 regulating
agriculture, known as La'ihat Zira'ut al-Fallah. This law was necessary,
according to its own preamble, because of an alleged decline - in industrial
skills, commodity production, and cultivation that had occurred
previouslyls
By the middle decades of the nineteenth century there was a shift in
the rhetoric of reform, with greater emphasis being placed on the idea of
progress. The Imperial Rescript of 1856 spoke of "renew[ing] and enlarg
[ing] still more the new institutions," and it linked those new institutions to
the position the Ottoman Empire held "among civilized nutionr.'leln Egypt,
ra2
in a similar vein, the Pasha's decrees in ttre 1840s concerning the census
invoked "progress and civilization" and "the attainment of ttre general
good" as reasons for enumerating the populatiort'fnt ti*ng of ttris shift in
the rhetoric of reform, from an emphasis on decline and recovery to the
attainment of progress and civilization, and the reasons for that, are beyond
the bounds of this paper, though they deserve to be studied in detail. For
now, suffice it to note that ttre rhetoric of nineteenth century reform carried a
thesis of pre-nineteenth century decline, which apparently derived from the
na s ihatname literature.
In Egypt, although there was a shift in emphasis in the reform
discourse from "decline and recovery" to "progress and civilization," the
memory of decline was preserved because it served to legitimate the
Muhammad Ali dynasty. In his speech from the ttrone opening Majlis
Shura al-Nawwab in 1866, Khedive Ismail stated that when his grandfather
Muhamrnad Ali became the govemor of Egypt, "he found it without any
taces of civilization, and he found its people deprived of security and
comfort," and so he devoted himself "to making the people secure and to
civilizing ttre counffy.#Loyutirt bureaucrat-intellectuals like Rifa'a Tahtawi
and Ali Mubarak also supported the claim of the Muhammad Ali dynasty
to have begun a new era of progressive ,hung.ltThis theme was canied
over into the British occupation period, with the bureaucrat-intellectual
Yacoub Artin inventing a history of progressive change in land tenure,
initiated by Muhammad Ali and canied forward by his successors, the aim
of which (or so futin claimed) was to establish private landownershipl}
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As for books on the history of modern Egypt published in fuabic in
the late nineteenth century, if the writer were pro-khedevial there was a
similar tendency was to highlight ttre role of the dynasty as a whoie, and not
just Muhammad Ali. In surveying bibliographies of fuabic books
published in Egypt before 1900 I found only one in which the subject was
Muhammad Ali himself: Muhammad Farid Bey, Bahjat al-tawfiqiya fi
tarikh mu'assis ql-'a'ila al-khidiwiya (Bulaq, 1893). The title describes
Muhammad Ali only as the founder of the khedivial dynasty, not "the
founder of modern Egypt," although ttre clear implication is that modem
Egyptian history began with the advent of that dynastylt
Royal patronage in the writing of history,
While the roots of the decline and revival thesis can be located in the
Ottoman nasihatname literature and ttre rhetoric of nineteenth century
reform, and it was nurtured by Muhammad Ali's successors, the idea that
the modem history of Egypt began wittr an awakening initiated by the
Pasha did not become widely accepted in modern historiography until the
twentiettr century. This was largely due to the efforts of the monarchy, and
especially King Fuad, to foster a national history befitting the newly
independent state as well as legitimating their dynasty. In the nineteenth
century, on the other hand, this idea was not universally accepted, and it had
to compete with altemative nanatives which either described the Pasha as a
desffoyer instead of a founder, or advanced ottrer candidates as the real
"founders" of modern Egypt.
ra4
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At the beginning of the nineteenth century, for example, the
historian al-Jabarti failed to perceive Napoleon and Muhammad Ali as
initiators of a new and better era. Instead, he tended to look back with
nostalgia to- ttre da;'s of Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu
"t5
al-Dhahah Al-Jubutti's unfavorable view of Muhammad Ali was due at
least in part to the Fasha's confiscation of iltizams and waqfs, from which
al-Jabarti and others of his class had derived a comfortable income. In 1815,
Muhammad Ali's Albanian ffoops revolted against his attempt to
implement the Nizam-i Jadidby drilling them in the "French" manner. The
Pasha barely escaped to the Citadel, whence he dispensed concessiotrs to the
Eoops, the ulama, and merchants in order to strengthen his position.
Al-Jabarti grumbled that had ttre Pasha not been so politically skilled, "il^,
would have turned against him due to his confiscation of iltizams andwaqfs'
And in yet another well-known passage in his history, ai-Jabarti's
description of the building of the lt4ahmudiyya canal emphasizes the burden
placed on the peasants who were corv6ed for this project, and alleges that
they suffered high mortary11n al-Jabarti's vieril, then, things had gone
downhill since the time of Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu
al-Dhahab.
During his rule Muhammad Ali and Egypt were the subject of
numerous French and English books, which is evidence of a lively mterest
in his reforms and conquests. The Pasha himself was concerned with his
image in Europe a1d sought to present himself to Europeans as anaL2,
enlightened reform# Yet although some writers admired him and praised
his projects, others sought to porffay him as a Wrant who was ruining ttre
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country:'Moreover, European interest in Muhammad Ali seems to have
been mainly due to the strategic and economic importance of Egypt and the
growing importance of the "Eastern Question" in international diplomacy
during the nineteenth century. Once ttre Pasha had passed from the scene,
European writers quickly tumed their attention to his successors.
For example, during his short rule Said Pasha (1854-63) was
exfravagantly praised by a few writers who saw his reforms in the land law
as a major tuming point in Egypt's history. One described Said's reforms as
har,:ng "the importance of a social revolution," and another described them
as transforming the Egyptian people from "slaves ... into free citizens.'t'It is
conceivable that had he ruied longer, or had one of his direct descendants
become the king in1922, Said might have become "the founder of modern
Egypt'instead of his father.
Yet another nanative of ttre history of modern Egypt was put
forward by British writers during the occupation period. These writers 
- 
for
obvious reasons 
- 
portrayed the British occupation as rescuing the counfiy
from disorder and bankruprcSi.' Thry downplayed the importance of
Muhammad Ali's reforms and portrayed Khedive Ismail as an incompetent
tyrant, in order to highlight the "enlilghtened" administration that they, the
British, had brought to Egypt as the most important turning point in its
history. Still other nanatives of modern Egyptian history began to be
advanced by nationalist writers during ttre occupation period. As Dr. Sayyid
Asmawi points out in his confribution to this volume, the nationalists had
differing views of Egypt's history and of ttre role of the khedivial dynasty in
it, and not all of them were favorable toward the dynasfy.
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Perhaps the most famous criticism of the role of Muhammad Ali by
an Egyptian was published by Muhammad Abduh in al-Manar in 1905'
Abduh described Egypt before the rule of Muhammad Ali as having had a
sAble social and political order in which the religious elites played a leading
and moderating role. The picture of pre-nineteenttr century Egypt that
Abduh sketched was not that of a society in decline and in need of revival,
and, consistent with rhat picture, he desgrifuMuhammad Ali as a desffoyer
rather than a foonder.l 
t
What spuned Abduh to pen his criticism of the Pasha was the
avalanche of speeches and articles in praise of Muhammad Ali on the
occasion of the centenary of his appointment as governor of Egypt in 1805.
A thorough survey of the periodical press in this period is beyond the
bounds of this paper, and Dr. Asmawi's contribution to this volume
discusses in detail the debate in the press 0n Muhammad Ali during these
centennial celebrations. Suffice it here to note that ttrere were two
celebrations, in 1902 and again in 1905, due to the divergence of the Islamic
and Gregorian calendars. The idea of Muhamrnrd Ali as "the founder of
modern Egypt" 
- 
inciuding the nickn.rrne itself 
- 
seems to have crystallized
in the interval between them. For example, in a speech delivered in
Alexandria on the evening of May 21,1902, the natiorr.;list leader Mustafa
Kamil spoke of "the work of Muhammad Ali that revivified the nation and
advanced it," though he was only warming up the crowd before calling for a
British euuruatiofr.]On the same day The Egyptian Gazette, a mouthpiece
for the British community in Egypt, opined that Muhammad Ali "rescued
lEgypt] frorn anarchy" and that "he is as worthy of the title of father of his
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counffy as any monarch in history." However, the writer also insisted that
the Pasha's reforms died with him, and no trace of them remained by the
time of the British orruputio,i.*H*ce the role of Britain as Egypt's rescuer
was maintained. Yet in conffast to that, during the 1905 celebraions the
Gazette's editors employed the now familiar nickname "the founder of
modern Egypt" as if it were already a familiar one. Similarly, the Vice
President of ttre Alexandria Municipality described the Pasha in a speech as
"l'auteur de I'Egypte modgrne." 3f
It is significant that the nickname "the founder of
modern Egypt" was coined in the context of the official
celebration of the centenary, which was organized by the
Palace. On one hand, the assignment of the role of "the
founder of modern Egypt" to Muhammad Ali was consistent
with the dynasty's rhetoric of reform and modernization. In
this respect it may be regarded as a restatement of the
historical narrative advanced, for example, in Khedive
Ismail's speech of 1866. On the other hand, the Palace now
had to contend with the alternative historical theses put forth
recently by the British and especially the anti-khedivial
nationalists. The struggle to definq Egypt's past was part of
the larger struggle between the Palace, the British, and the
anti-khedivial nationalists over Egypt's political'futurS! m
this context the Palace appears to have exploited the
opportunity of the 1902-19A5 centennial to assign to the
founder of the khedivial dynasty 
- 
and hence to the dynasty
itself 
-.a central place in the narrative of national history.
I
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The struggle for Egypt and the contest over its past
intensified after the First world war, and Muhammad Ali
began to be named "the founder of modern Egypt" in book
titles. Abd al-Halim Hilmi al-Misri's Muhammad ,ali
al-kabir munshi' misr al-hadith appeared in 1919, and Ilyas
Ayyubi's Tarikh muhammad 'ali rntr'assis misr al-haditha
wa ,i, al-'a'ila ql-karima appeared in I92Z:.+ tn the
following year Ayyubi published a two-volume history of
the era of Khedive Ismail'(the grandson of Muhammad Ali
and father of Fuad), which extended the narrative of
progress under the auspices of the khedivial dynasty into the
late nineteenth century and maintained a continuity between
"the founder of modern Egypt" and the current monarch.
Indeed it was largely due to the efforts of his
great-grandson, King Fuad, that Muhammad Ali's role as
"the founder of modern Egypt" became firmly established in
historiography. Fuad's role as a patron of intellectual
activity resembles that of his father, though it has not
received adequate attention from historians. while a prince
he was the royal patron of the Egyptian University (now
cairo university), founded in 190g, and once on the throne
he saw to the organization of a national archive in Abdin
Palace. National archives had been organized for the
pu{pose of historical research several decades earlier in
western Europe and the u.s.A. Like a national library or
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museum, a research archive had become one of the
appurtenances of a modern state. Such an archive would
facilitate as well as influence the writing of the history of the
state 
- 
especially in Egypt, where the Abdin archive was the
personal property of the 
- 
King, who controlled its
organizatron and access to itlo
Additionally, King Fuad and (to a lesser extent) and
his son Faruq patronized historical research and writing on a
grand scale, the aim of which was to further develop a
narrative of modern national history that was inseparable
from that of their dynasty. Largely as a result of their efforts,
some fifty scholarly books in French, English, and Italian
dealing with Muhammad Ali and/or Egypt during his era
were published between 1900 and 1950loMuny, though not
all, were published in Egypt. Nearly three-quarters of those
titles appeared in the 1930s, and the second-largest number
appeared in the I920s, clearly indicating the role of Fuad (r.
l9I7 -1936) as a patron of historical scholarship. Many of
these works are substantial collections of selected
diplomatic documents from European archives, hundreds of
pages in length, published by the Royal Geographical
Society under the personal auspices of the King. One of the
monographs of this period was by the British historian
Henry Dodwell, entitled The Founder of Modern Egypt: a
Study of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge,1931). It was Dodwell
L
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who popularrzed this nickname for Muhammad Ali in the
Anglophone world.
During the same half-century, more than forty works
were published in Arabic in Egypt on Muhammad Ali
and/or Egypt during his erf,.' Several of these titles were
pamphlets or printed speeches of less than forty pages in
length, including the text of Mustafa Kamil's L902 speech,
printed by the press of his newspaper, al-Liwa'. However,
most were works of more than a hundred pages, and several
were substantial scholarly studies like Ahmad'Izzat'Abd
al-Karim's history of education under Muhammad Ali, and
Ahmad Ahmad al-Hitta's history of agriculture. The
numerical disparity in favor of European-language books
seems to reflect three factors. First, history was established
as a professional discipline in Egypt comparatively late,
with the re-founding of the Egyptian University in 1925, and
archival studies in Arabic began to appear only in the 1930s.
Second, although there was a steady output of historical
writing in Arabic throughout this period, the Palace was
unable to control or influence all of it. A significant
proportion of it was produced by men and women who were
not Palace supporters, and hence on subjects other than the
exploits of Muhammad Ali and his successorr]'Third, th.
large colpus of European-language works seems to har c
been aimed, at least in part, at influencing the construction
of Egypt's historical narrative in the West.
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In addition to books on Muhammad Ali and his era,
numerous other books (not included in the above account)
appeared in this period that dealt with various aspects of the
modern history of Egypt. Nearly all of them begin the
narrative of modern history with the French expedition
and/or the rise of Muhammad Ali, and all emphasize the
pivotal role of the Pasha. An illustrative example rs Coup
d'Oeil sur la Chronologie de la nation Egyptienne, by
Joseph Cattaui Pasha, published in Cairo in t931. The
Cattaui (Qattawi) family were one of the most prominent
Sephardic Jewish-Egypian families of the early twentieth
century, tracing their roots in Egypt to the eighth century.
Among his many business and political activities, Joseph.
Cattaui was a founding director of Bank Misr in 1920.
Cattaui divided the nation's history into several epochs, and,
in keeping with the contemporary liberal nationalist
construction of it, he began with the pre-dynastic period. He
identified the period extending from the Persian conquest in
late antiquity through Ottoman rule up to 1805 aan era of
foreign conquest and rule, and in contrast to that, he labeled
the era of Muhammad Ali and his dynasty ut tl: period of
"national renaissance" and "the national epoch."
The liberal nationalist perspective was quite similar
to, but not exactly the same as the viewpoint found in
contemporary studies by sympathetic Europeans. An
tt2 
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example of the latter is A.E. Crouchley's study of foreign
investment and the public debt, commissioned by the
Ministry of Finance and published by it in 1936. "Modern
Egypt," Crouchley wrote in his introduction, "begins with
Mohamad Ali." Yet whereas the liberal nationalists tended
to attribute the pre-nineteenth century decline to foreign
(especially Turkish) rule, in Crouchley's view the cause of
Egypt's decline was its isolation from progressive
developments in Europe, an isolation that Muhammad Ali
u{
ended.''
During the monarchy period, also, a smaller though
still significant number of books appeared on Muhammad
Ali's son and grandson, Ibrahim and Ismail, the aim of
which was to secure their place in history as well. The
reigns of Abbas I and Said (1849-1863) were almost
completely neglected. From any perspective, those years
ate a crucial period in Egypt's history, but Fuad and Faruq
were direct descendants of Muhammad Ali, Ibrahim, and
Ismail. The historical narrative promoted by the kings had
no place for Abbas and Said, and partly as a consequence
there is gap in our knowledge of their period thar persisrs ro
this day.
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Conclusion.
This paper highlights the Ottoman and Egyptian
contribution to the decline and revival thesis and the related
idea of Muhammad Ali as "the founder of modern Egypt" as
a way of explaining why those theses are so persistent in
narratives of Egyptian history. One may object to the
forgoing on the ground that Muhammad Ali's reforms did
indeed lay the foundations of a modern nation-state. Or,
alternatively, one might argue that rcgardless of whether the
P4sha's nickname is justified, the many qualitative changes
that occurred in the nineteenth century do justify a sharp
distinction between the "modern" and "Ottoman" periods.
However, such objections would not address the main point
of this paper, which is not proposing simply to construct a
new narrative of history in opposition to the conventional
one. Rather, the aim is to suggest that we as historians have
no obligation to stay within the boundaries and categories of
the conventional narrative, since important aspects of it were
constructed originally in support of political agendas. The
purpose, as I have tried to show, was to close the debate on
Egyptian history rather to open it to further inquiry. Hence,
to the extent that we accept those boundaries and categories
uncritically, as if they were revealed scripture, our work will
be inhibited.
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